Minxia Chen
Portrait of Minxia Chen

Minxia Chen /MIN-shyah/

INSEAD, Finance Department

Finance job market candidate · 2026–27

minxia.chen@insead.edu Google Scholar SSRN

I study the demand for information in household and behavioral finance. Digital brokerage platforms make information acquisition nearly costless and, importantly, directly observable: what investors choose to read, watch, or investigate reveals what information they demand, rather than requiring inference from proxies such as news coverage or trading. My account-level data link trading, watchlists, clickstream, news-reading, and AI-assistant records for the same investors at a large retail brokerage.

My research examines three margins of information demand. First, how do investors choose what information will reach them in the future? Adding a stock to a watchlist is not simply a choice to look at it; it changes how information about that stock reaches the investor thereafter, including information she never actively seeks. (The Watchlist Trap) Second, why do investors seek less information precisely when they need it most? For stocks they own, information is readily available, yet demand to learn about a position falls sharply when it is losing. (Does Information Reduce Biases?) Third, how does information demand respond when the technology delivering information changes? An unexpected upgrade to an AI assistant changes the information environment without changing investors’ portfolios, allowing me to study how demand responds to a change in the technology of delivery. (Trading on the Chatbot’s Clock)

These settings distinguish choices made before information arrives from choices made once it is available. A watchlist addition can shape what information reaches an investor later; seeking information is a separate choice about what to acquire. This distinction allows me to trace information demand from the formation of the information environment, through acquisition, to the information received and trades that follow. In ongoing work, I study the final link: when a push notification fails to arrive for technical reasons, the news remains available but the prompt to attend to it is missing, separating the arrival of information from its content. (Push to Read and Trade)

News

Research at a glance

attention information household finance behavioral finance retail investors digital platforms AI trading watchlists prices markets information acquisition AI chatbots disposition effect push notifications music royalty markets AI disclosure Islamic bonds (Sukuk) analyst forecasts news ownership beliefs speculation clickstream brokerage apps warm vs cold buys ostrich effect reference dependence clientele effects yield spreads auctions consideration sets emerging markets large language models investomers field data China streaming mistimed entry disclosure regimes attention information household finance behavioral finance retail investors digital platforms AI trading watchlists prices markets information acquisition AI chatbots disposition effect push notifications music royalty markets AI disclosure Islamic bonds (Sukuk) analyst forecasts news ownership beliefs speculation clickstream

Research

My research statement is available upon request — email me.

Job Market Paper

The Watchlist Trap

Solo-authored.

Abstract

A watchlist records a form of attention prior work could not see: a self-authored, dated commitment to follow a stock, made before any purchase. Using 28,990 Chinese retail investors whose every purchase is linked to a timestamped watchlist entry, I show that the stocks investors watch but do not buy outperform the stocks they buy — yet among purchases, those routed through the watchlist (warm) underperform purchases made on sight (cold) by 234 basis points of characteristic-adjusted return over the next sixty trading days. The list’s signal is good; the trap is in the conversion from watching to buying. Roughly 45% of the gap reflects composition — watched purchases carry more costly speculative tendencies. The surviving mechanism for the rest is reference-dependent conversion: the daily first-purchase hazard changes slope sharply as the price crosses the level at which the stock was added and the extremes witnessed while it waited.

Publication

Clientele Effect in Sovereign Bonds: Evidence from Islamic Sukuk Bonds in Malaysia

With Joseph Cherian, Ziyun Li, Yuping Shao, and Marti G. Subrahmanyam  ·  Critical Finance Review, 2022, 11(3–4), 677–745

Abstract

The demand for Malaysian Islamic bonds (Sukuk), in the largest and most active Islamic market in the world, comes from two sources: conventional and Islamic investors, with the latter group holding only Islamic bonds by mandate. Surprisingly, Malaysian Islamic sovereign bonds have a 4.8 bps higher yield than their conventional counterparts, ceteris paribus. We attribute this spread to foreign institutional investors participating actively in the conventional market, but not as much in the Islamic market. Using transaction-level data, we document four pieces of evidence that point towards clientele effects, particularly for foreign investors, which affect the yield spread.

Working Papers

Does Information Reduce Biases?

With Liqiang Huang and Massimo Massa.

Abstract

Why does the disposition effect survive in information-rich trading environments? Using clickstream and trading records for 10,000 investors on a large Chinese online trading platform, we find that active information collection sharpens gain-side exits but worsens loss-side outcomes: clicked-on retained losers underperform by an additional 1.5–2.0 percent, offsetting the net trading benefit. Two mechanisms drive the asymmetry: an ostrich effect in acquisition, whereby focal-stock losses reduce abnormal clicking by 39 percent, and cognitive inertia in processing, whereby investors who examine losses fail to act. Because the preferences that generate the bias also allocate attention, self-directed information collection cannot correct it.

Trading on the Chatbot’s Clock

Solo-authored.

Abstract

On February 8, 2025, a large Chinese retail brokerage swapped the large language model behind its in-app chatbot for DeepSeek, leaving the chatbot’s sibling services untouched. Measuring exposure to the upgrade with strictly predetermined pre-launch usage, I find that more-exposed investors consulted the news less often, while the composition of what they still read — concentration, slant, staleness, pre-trade diligence — is bounded near zero: the upgrade changed how often investors read, not what. Around the same upgrade, the risk-adjusted performance of these investors’ subsequent first purchases deteriorated relative to observably identical engaged users — a within-stock, mistimed-entry effect that survives reversion controls, permutation inference, and nine placebo launch dates. As AI assistants become a front door to financial information, a quality upgrade can change when investors act without changing what they know.

When Consumers Become Investors (Investomers): Ownership Effects in Music Royalty Markets

With Liqiang Huang, Xi Kang, and Yahe Tan.

Abstract

Can ownership change not only what consumers hold, but also where their attention goes? In fractional music-royalty auctions on a major Chinese streaming platform, winners acquire royalty shares of individual songs while near-miss bidders in the same auction do not. Comparing winners with the closest unsuccessful bidders in a difference-in-differences design, we find that ownership increases listening to the owned song — and, beyond it, to other, non-owned songs in the same genre. The spillover is concentrated in active, user-initiated listening, with no increase in recommendation-driven passive listening, and realized royalty income explains little of the response. The evidence points to ownership-induced attention reallocation: a financial stake redirects consumers’ attention toward related content and what they choose to experience.

The Selection Behind the Penalty: Strategic and Mandatory AI Disclosure in Music Streaming

With Xi Kang, Yahe Tan, Wanshu Niu, and Liqiang Huang.

Abstract

Generative AI increasingly assists the creation of cultural goods, and regulators are mandating that AI involvement be labeled — on the premise that a label taxes the artists who use it. Does disclosing AI assistance actually cost artists, or does the apparent penalty reflect the strategic choice of which work they reveal? We study a leading music-streaming platform whose integrated AI tool let artists choose whether to credit AI use, before a platform-wide mandate removed that choice. Under voluntary disclosure, concealed AI songs outperform the same artist’s credited AI songs roughly threefold in plays — but artists credit AI on songs that enter new genres or carry a more visible human hand. Exploiting the mandatory-label rollout in a difference-in-differences design, we estimate the causal listener penalty at about five percent of plays: observational data overstate the market cost of mandated AI disclosure by more than an order of magnitude.

Work in Progress

Push to Read and Trade

Solo-authored.

Abstract

Attention is a double-edged sword in financial markets: it motivates investors to research stocks and trade on what they learn, potentially improving price discovery, yet it can also discourage research and trading when investors believe the news is already priced in or when strategic substitutability makes them hesitant to act. I examine this dual role through mobile push notifications, whose delivery is otherwise endogenous: recommender systems push news about the very stocks investors already track. Exploiting a random technical split under which a small share of a brokerage’s push notifications goes undelivered, I compare investors who received a push — the news plus an attention trigger — with investors who received the news only. A push raises active stock research by 2.7 percent within the hour, far more for watchlist, portfolio, and focus-list stocks, and the effect dissipates within a day.

Do Machines Help Analysts? Evidence from AI-Augmented Equity Forecasts

With Xi Kang and Xinran Zhao.

Abstract

Does AI support make stock analysts more accurate? We study a major U.S. brokerage that launched an internal machine-learning model producing daily equity price forecasts — available exclusively to its in-house analysts from 2012, and to clients from 2013. In a difference-in-differences design comparing the brokerage’s analysts to coverage-matched analysts at other brokerages, we find the opposite of the intended effect: analysts’ absolute price-forecast errors rise by 4.5 percentage points after they gain access to the machine forecasts, with flat pre-treatment trends, and treated analysts become less likely to beat the machine than matched controls. Access to algorithmic support can degrade rather than discipline human judgment — a cautionary result for the adoption of AI in financial analysis.

Dollar Funding Pressure, Syndication Structure, and Inefficient Monitoring: Evidence from the U.S. Syndicated Loan Market during the Euro Crisis

Solo-authored. Inactive

Abstract

Classical banking theory says lead banks should retain a significant fraction of the loans they syndicate: they hold an information advantage over participant investors and bear the responsibility of monitoring. The past two decades, however, saw the rise of the originate-to-distribute model, in which lead banks sell loans to institutional investors right after origination and retain no exposure to the borrower — weakening the information-asymmetry account of retention shares. I ask whether the tightness of the lead arranger’s funding constraint helps explain retention motives and syndication structure. During the Euro crisis, Eurozone banks most dependent on U.S. money market funds cut their dollar-denominated U.S. lending by more than less-dependent banks, and the loans they originated attracted fewer participant lenders while the number of lead banks remained unchanged.

Teaching

My teaching statement and the full student evaluations for both courses are available upon request — email me.

INSEAD

Outstanding MBA Tutor Award
AY 2022–23
Tutor, Financial Markets and Valuation (MBA core; instructor: Naveen Gondhi)
Student evaluation: 4.67 / 5.00
AY 2021–22
Tutor, Corporate Financial Policy (MBA core; instructor: John Kuong)
Student evaluation: 4.46 / 5.00
AY 2020–21

Curriculum Vitae

The CV will be posted here shortly.